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Abstract: Narrative practices have the potential to play 
a robust part in strategies for self-managing psychoso-
cial well-being. Narrative therapy in particular seeks to 
empower groups and individuals, providing them with 
the resources and skills needed for positively improving 
their own well-being and coping with a wide range of 
life challenges. However, narrative therapy is in need 
of a philosophical update and some theoretical fine-
tuning. Re-authoring some key elements of narrative 
therapy’s official narrative will not only improve our 
understanding of it but increase the chances of a wider 
uptake of self-management strategies. Some features of 
narrative therapy’s self-understanding invite and require 
clarification or adjustment in order to benefit from new 
thinking in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. 
Keywords: narrative therapy, folk psychology, self, 
self-management, cognitive science 
How we narrate our lives can affect us, for good or ill. Our narrative practices make an undeniable difference to our 
psychosocial well-being. All so-called “talking 
cures” – including traditional psychoanalytic and 
psychodynamic approaches to therapy and newer 
techniques – are motivated by this insight about 
the power of personal narratives. All therapies of 
the discursive ilk make use of narratives, in one 
way or another, as a means of enabling individu-
als to frame, or reframe, and to manage their life 
circumstances in richer or new ways (Lock & 
Strong, 2012). 
Narrative Therapy (hereafter NT), an impor-
tant sub-class of talking therapies, breaks faith 
with more traditional psychodynamic approaches 
in adopting a not-knowing interactive stance. NT, 
developed by White and Epston in the early 1990s, 
stands out in seeking to empower individuals and 
groups by getting them to look again at their habits 
of self-narration and to explore the possibility of 
telling new stories about their individual or col-
lective lives: “As people become more narratively 
resourced . . . they find that they have available 
to them options for action that would not have 
otherwise been imaginable” (White, 2011, p. 5, 
emphasis added). The aim of NT is to expand the 
individual’s or group’s “options in self-formation” 
(White, 2004, p. 43). 
NT practitioners pursue this aim by helping 
individuals or groups to re-author or re-story 
conversations, enabling them to see new avenues 
for action and by improving their capacities to 
respond to such affordances. In terms of its ambi-
tions and style, NT “seeks to be a respectful, non-
blaming approach to counseling and community 
work, which centers people as the experts in their 
own lives” (Morgan, 2000, p. 4). In short, NT uses 
158 ■ PPP / Vol. 24, No. 2 / June 2017
special techniques in order to provide the tools 
that enable people take responsibility for their 
own mental to health and exercise their agency 
in maintaining it in positive ways. NT equips 
individuals with powerful tools that can enhance 
the self-management of mental healthcare. 
Although NT is very much in the mold of “talk-
ing cures”, it does not seek to understand past 
causes of current trauma through such means. 
NT’s working assumption is: “Change the over-
arching narrative representation and deeper and 
more extensive opportunities for engaging in novel 
behaviors can be achieved” (Russell et al., 2004, 
p. 215). Consequently, its main aim is to use nar-
rative techniques to get people to construct a more 
positive “future trajectory rather than achieving 
past accuracy” (Graham, 2010, p. 14). 
Decades after its inception, NT is now well 
established in practice. NT is widely used as a 
basis for personal, family and community inter-
vention and treatment around the world. It is 
especially popular in Australia and New Zealand, 
where it originated, having its main base in the 
Dulwich Centre, Adelaide which was founded in 
1984. Other Centers and Institutes of NT have 
been established in parts of the English-speaking 
world, Canada, the UK and USA. Although there 
is limited scientific evidence of the efficacy of NT, 
it enjoys a reputation as providing an attractive 
means of supporting people from diverse back-
grounds. For example, NT has been used to help 
people deal with a wide range of problems, from 
asthma, anorexia, bulimia, depression and other 
psychiatric illnesses to trauma (Murdoch, 2009, 
p. 494). As such, it has the potential to inform 
approaches to self-management in mental health 
care. This is especially so on the assumption that 
the sorts of narrative skills, once acquired, can be 
deployed independently, without continued reli-
ance on therapists.
Despite its successes, NT is in need of a philo-
sophical update and some theoretical fine-tuning. 
By re-authoring some key elements of narrative 
therapy’s official narrative, the therapy itself will 
be afforded new possibilities for development and 
wider uptake. This paper provides an initial analy-
sis of some features of narrative therapy’s self-
understanding that invite and require clarification 
or adjustment if it is to benefit from new thinking 
in and a wider engagement with philosophy and 
the cognitive sciences. 
Section 1 reviews NT’s official story about its 
working methods and theoretical assumptions. 
Section 2 shows that certain of NT’s central as-
sumptions – about science, folk psychology and 
the self – are in need of revision so as to enable 
NT’s further theoretical and practical develop-
ment. Section 3 supplies first pass answers about 
how NT might revise its narrative concerning these 
assumptions in order to become more internally 
coherent and to enter into a more positive and 
cooperative relationship with sciences of the mind. 
The concluding Section 5 briefly summarizes how 
the future development of NT along the theoretical 
lines we propose opens up promising new pos-
sibilities for NT to feature in self-management 
mental healthcare strategies.
Narrative therapy: The 
official story 
One of NT’s central tenets is that deficiency-
centered stories limit options for action (White, 
2004, p. 34). Such stories pathologize and dis-
empower people by making it seem as if their 
problems are an essential part of who they are. In 
general, prêt-à-porter narratives – those inherited 
uncritically from the surrounding culture – tend 
to foster such negative and limited ways of think-
ing. Such narratives restrict a person’s vision and 
capacities for self-understanding by presenting 
only a limited array of options. Those who operate 
with such “thin” narratives perceive fewer of the 
genuine possibilities for action, fewer affordances. 
The danger, as NT practitioners point out, is 
that “All too often, the stories we believe about 
ourselves have been written by others” (Denbor-
ough, 2014, p. 8). In passively buying into and 
repeating narrow and negative narratives we 
unnecessarily restrict our life possibilities. NT 
guards against this by questioning such narratives, 
insisting on the need for people to reclaim and 
take back their “storytelling rights” (Denborough, 
2014, p. 8, 10, 22). The practices of NT help 
people to reclaim these rights, by enabling them 
“to break from thin conclusions about their lives, 
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about their identities, and about their relation-
ships” (White, 2000, p. 4). This way of seeing the 
landscape of therapy is connected to one of NT’s 
grounding post-structuralist assumptions that “it 
is not one’s motive that shapes action, but one’s 
account of one’s motive that has been socially 
derived in narrative negotiations that does so” 
(White, 2000, p. 4). 
Chief amongst NT’s tools for combatting such 
life-limiting stories is that of externalizing conver-
sations that “open options for people to redefine or 
revise their relationships with a problem” (White, 
2004, p. 32; Murdoch, 2009, p. 501). NT’s favor-
ite slogan is that “the person is not the problem, 
the problem is the problem” (Denborough, 2014, 
p. 26). The crucial move in getting clients to see 
this is to get them to abandon the idea that the 
problem is a crippling, essential feature of the indi-
vidual or group and come to treat it as something 
apart and distinct from themselves – something 
that can be addressed and dealt with by means 
of a number of strategies. NT thus “refuses to 
locate problems inside people . . . [it] refuses to 
pathologize people” (Denborough, 2014, p. 26). 
The main NT strategy is to find new, richer 
stories to tell about one’s life, and thus augment 
one’s resources; this involves finding and attending 
to so-called “unique outcomes” – those “sparkling 
moments” – in which one’s problem did not im-
pede the living of life; those times at which one 
had the strength and means to deal with it effec-
tively or to put it aside (Murdoch, 2009, p. 500; 
Denborough, 2014, p. 49). The end result of this 
process of re-storying, if all goes well, is increased 
“response-ability” – enabling people to become 
“more able to respond” (Denborough, 2014, 
p. 36). This involves developing and mobilizing 
one’s practical know-how and life skills (White, 
2004, p. 39, 40). Once these new self-management 
capacities are established, further NT conversa-
tions help to provide the necessary support and 
scaffolding to ensure that the new, richer storylines 
and the expanded possibilities for action associ-
ated with them take root and flourish. 
The crucial point is that by shifting one’s think-
ing, so that problems are externalized, new ways 
of being and new possibilities for action are put 
on the table. All of this works because narratives 
are necessarily selective. Whichever story we tell 
about our lives there are always other options 
– possibilities that were not foregrounded, not 
mentioned, not attended to. Any story of the days 
of our lives – even a single day of our lives – is 
never the whole story. Hence “there are many dif-
ferent events in our lives, but only some of them 
get formed into the storylines of our identities” 
(Denborough, 2014, p. 6).
As such it need not be that a dominant story is 
false; it is enough that a dominant story is limited 
and partial, occluding alternative storylines that 
can possibly “provide the gateway or point of 
entry to the exploration of other knowledges of 
life and other skills of living or practices of life 
that are cultural and historical” (White, 2011, 
p. 9). By taking a fresh and fuller look at their 
own lives people can explore healthier possibilities 
for narrating it – they can “rework or rewrite the 
storylines of identity” (Denborough, 2014, p. 3, 
21). Here it is important to recognize that NT 
does not view the alternative storylines it helps to 
foster as radically constructed (see White, 2004, 
p. 43; White, 2011, p. 9). On the contrary, they are 
deemed more realistic, fuller accounts of one’s life. 
Problematic Stories: Science, 
Folk Psychology and Self
Given the way NT seeks to retrain and em-
power individuals it has great promise to add to 
the range of self-managed approaches to mental 
health, but it needs updating. Certain familiar 
philosophical assumptions about the nature of 
science, folk psychology, and selves are obscuring 
a healthier understanding of NT, and are remov-
ing or reducing fruitful opportunities for NT to 
engage with the best philosophy and science of 
the mind. Put otherwise, it appears that dominant 
stories about science, folk psychology and selves, 
embraced or endorsed by leading NT practitioners, 
may be standing in the way of valuable possibilities 
for NT’s future theoretical, scientific and practical 
investigation, assessment and development. We 
identify three main sources of tension. 
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Conflating Scientism with science
NT subscribes to a constructivist framework 
that promotes the view that social realities are 
something that we can create and construct for 
ourselves, even if not radically. In this NT is 
directly inspired by the interpretive turn made 
prominent by French postmodernists. In adhering 
to a post-structuralist framework NT opposes the 
sort of exclusive scientific realism associated with 
grand narratives about science (see Murdoch, 
2009, p. 491, 494). NT justifiably rejects the idea 
that there is one and only one true story to be told 
about ourselves and the world – especially when, 
to this basic claim, it is added that such a story 
must be told, in the end, in the vocabulary of the 
hard sciences – preferably, if possible, only in the 
language of physics. Following in Foucault’s foot-
steps, NT practitioners treat this claim as part and 
parcel of “the ‘grand abstractions’ of reductionist 
science . . . [abstractions that have] dehumanized 
and objectified people” (Combs & Freedman, 
2004, p. 139). 
There are certainly many excellent reasons to be 
suspicious of and indeed hostile towards exclusive, 
reductionist “scientistic grand narratives” (see 
Putnam, 1990; Hutto, 2000). Yet those reasons 
are not good reasons to be suspicious of truth, 
objectivity or the sciences – when understood in 
a suitably modest fashion.
Philosophically speaking, if postmodern suspi-
cions about truth and objectivity are overplayed 
it becomes difficult to make sense of how NT is 
meant to work in practice in a way consistent with 
NT’s official story. For it is not as if NT avoids 
commitment to the idea that there are truths 
about our lives that outstrip the stories we tell 
about them. Rather it claims that as, “we retell 
and rewrite the stories of our life, the facts of our 
lives won’t change, but their meaning will change” 
(Denborough, 2014, p. 21). Yet it is not just the 
meanings we adopt that change in such cases, 
our practices and underlying skill sets alter too. 
Something over and above our narrative choices 
changes in the process. After all, NT assumes that 
through narrative practice we can reshape our 
current life and thereby alter future possibilities 
for engagement. This is precisely why “it makes a 
real difference how we talk about the problems in 
our lives” (Denborough, 2014, p. 242, emphasis 
added).
The stories we tell about ourselves either open 
up or close down affordances and therefore make 
factual, existential differences to possibilities for 
living our lives. We can alter the possibilities 
for living a life by narrating that life differently. 
These ideas are at the very heart of NT. Through 
re-authoring one comes “to attach significance 
to some . . . previously neglected events” (White, 
2011, p. 5). And by attaching significance indi-
viduals contribute “to possibilities for significantly 
different responses to the events of their lives” 
(White, 2011, p. 6).
Practically speaking, the hostility some NT 
practitioners bear towards scientistic grand narra-
tives has apparently led, through guilt by associa-
tion, to unnecessarily hostile relations between NT 
and the empirical sciences. NT practitioners typi-
cally shun formal, empirical assessments, allegedly 
for two main reasons: “First, traditional models 
of assessment assume a single reality to which the 
therapist has access. Second, these processes tend 
to be pathology-oriented and may ignore cultural 
or other contextual factors” (Murdoch, 2009, 
p. 499). A bad consequence of NT’s steering clear 
of the empirical sciences, however, is that “little 
traditional theory testing or outcome research can 
be found that is specific to NT counseling” (Mur-
doch, 2009, p. 513).1 The lack of proper empirical 
credentials has in turn resulted in NT not being 
deemed a scientifically respectable form of therapy 
by mainstream researchers and practitioners. 
The mutual antagonism between NT and scien-
tific approaches to mind and mental health works 
to keep NT “outside the mainstream elaboration 
of psychotherapy by university-based research and 
training programmes” (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 53, 
Vromans & Schweitzer, 2011, p. 5). By developing 
healthier relations with the sciences of the mind, 
NT can avoid being “on the fringe” – of being the 
sort of approach that mainstream mental health 
and policymakers are likely to systematically 
ignore, or at least marginalize. Addressing this is 
important to prevent them from overlooking and 
underrating NT’s unique story-based and valuable 
form of therapy.
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Shallow and Culturally Biased Folk 
Psychology
Another major reason why NT is not better 
and more widely received is that it is fundamen-
tally committed to folk psychology (hereafter FP) 
(White, 2004). The trouble is that FP “hasn’t fared 
that well in the arena of professional psycholo-
gies. It is lowly ranked and marginalized by these 
psychologies” (White,p. 2004, 20). FP is arguably 
best thought of as a kind of domestic anthropol-
ogy – one “mired in biases of local culture” (see 
e.g., Stich, 1983, Hutto, 2008). As such, FP expla-
nations don’t run very deep. Let’s consider these 
worries in reverse order. 
There is every reason to doubt that FP expla-
nations get at the true causes of action. Hence, 
if it is assumed that NT’s main therapeutic task 
depends on having a deep understanding of the 
mind then NT runs into trouble since FP explana-
tions are “not up to the sophistication and rigor 
required by modern psychology” (White, 2004, 
p. 20). Essentially, when it comes to explaining 
the basic mechanics and dynamics of the mind, 
FP is viewed as being unscientific and naïve in 
its conceptions. In a word, FP is just too shallow 
and “folksy” to be a respectable part of a proper 
science of the mind needed for illuminating the 
basis of psychopathologies. For:
mind has an existence and substantive character 
that goes well beyond, and is independent of our 
best commonsense interpretative practices. Hence 
knowing the truth about the mind requires a 
great deal more than informed reflection on those 
practices. In fact, it requires cognitive science 
(Carruthers, 2011, p. xiv).
We agree with Carruthers that cognitive sci-
ence, not folk psychology, reveals the basic nature 
of minds. We disagree with him in thinking that 
cognitive science will end up endorsing some form 
of classic cognitivism. Nevertheless, the above 
remarks highlight the need for NT to take stock 
of debates about the fundamental nature of minds 
if it is to properly situate its form of therapy and 
justify it within a wider set of possible approaches. 
Making this effort would also allow NT to benefit 
from new findings in cognitive science that could 
shed light on how narratives play their part in 
changing attitudes and habits.
What about the cultural bias worry? NT is 
“shaped” and “informed” by an FP tradition that 
lays great stress on notions of (1) personal agency 
as driven by (2) intentional attitudes (beliefs, de-
sires, hopes) and how they interact (White, 2004, 
p. 20, 28, 49). To construe FP in this way, and to 
make it foundational to the thinking behind NT – 
part of its very basis – renders NT culturally biased 
and skewed, despite its best intentions. 
This is ironic, given NT’s appeal to post-struc-
turalism, since the emphasis on personal agency 
and intentional states is arguably a feature of the 
Western, Eurocentric “theory of mind”– a “re-
flection of this folk psychology’s theory of mind” 
(White, 2004, p. 20, emphasis added). White 
claims that such an emphasis “is still strongly 
featured in the great majority of folk psychological 
accounts of human action” (White, 2004, p. 20). 
That may well be true of WEIRD people (those 
from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
and Democratic countries) but there is evidence 
of divergent practices too, that some people from 
other cultures favor other styles of FP explana-
tions (see Hutto, 2008; Fiebich, 2014; Hutto & 
Kirchhoff, forthcoming). As a result, so long as 
NT gives pride of place to a peculiarly Western 
form of FP at its basis, “NT can’t just be blindly 
applied in cultures other than the ones in which it 
originated” (Murdoch, 2009, p. 511).2 
It is well known that “Effective cultural con-
sultation requires an awareness of the constraints 
of [power, prejudice, identity and cultural dis-
sonance] on clinicians’ agency, engagement and 
positioning as well as on clients” (Guzder, 2014 
p. 164). NT therapists actively and sensitively 
adjust their practices in light of cross-cultural dif-
ferences. For example, therapists working within 
an overwhelmingly white Australian culture 
reshape their therapeutic practice significantly 
when dealing with Aboriginal communities (see, 
e.g. Denborough et al., 2006). African and Pales-
tinian NT practitioners – who operate in contexts 
where the we/I balance differs than in conceptions 
of Western folk psychology – must modify and 
even sometimes invent their own forms of nar-
rative practice. Over last 20 years, The Dulwich 
Centre has actively sought to ensure its approach 
is appropriately sensitive to such differences in 
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outlook through cross-cultural partnerships. To 
complete this work NT also needs to update the 
official vision of folk psychology that informs its 
background philosophy in line with these adjust-
ments to its practice. 
Subjected selves
NT focuses on opening up possibilities for 
active and creative self-development through re-
authoring. As such it requires an understanding of 
selves that is more protean and open-ended than 
the modern, Western conception allows. Thus it 
sets its face against a tradition of thought that iden-
tifies selves as enduring egos, entities that persist 
and survive unscathed through change – it rejects 
the picture of an “adamantine self – obdurate and 
unchanging” (Kirmayer, 2003, p. 179). In place of 
this notion of the self, NT looks to postmodernism 
for inspiration.
The intellectual links between NT and post-
structuralist/postmodern theory are so tight that 
NT is sometimes dubbed “postmodern therapy” 
(Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 54). Accordingly, NT is 
fundamentally anti-essentialist when it comes to 
thinking about selves. It is highly critical of “West-
ern culture’s taken-for-granted understandings 
that construct a self at the center of personhood” 
(White, 2004, p. 32).
There is a tension, however, between adopt-
ing standard postmodern visions of the self and 
NT’s fundamental commitment to the possibility 
of personal transformations. Commitment to the 
idea that individuals and groups can transform 
themselves “separates these therapists from what 
has been the view of postmodern philosophers that 
the subject is a passive creation of social discourse” 
(Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 65). Again, there is a need 
to re-author NT’s official story: Polkinghorne goes 
on to argue that “[narrative therapists] need to be 
less impressed by the version of postmodernism 
developed in the work of. . . French postmodern 
philosophers and more aggressive in their pre-
sentation of their own version of an existentially 
informed postmodernism of human self-creation”. 
The challenge, then, is for NT therapists to become 
“more assertive in their rejection of the empty and 
powerless subject,” (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 65).3 
NT needs to say more precisely how we should 
conceive of the self that is, at once, both the agent 
and the patient self-management. 
Alternative stories: Science, 
folk psychology and the self
In the limited space available, we want to sketch 
some positive revisions to NT concerning the three 
topics identified above that will overcome the 
sorts of theoretical and practical difficulties NT 
currently encounters. This is a prolegomena for 
future work and deeper investigations. 
Science not scientism 
The existing scientific literature lends broad 
empirical support to NT’s working assumption 
that certain narrative practices, those involving 
particular kinds of rich storied content, used in 
particular ways for particular purposes, corre-
lates positively with mental health. A number of 
findings demonstrate that people “who are able 
to narrate the emotional events of their lives in 
more self-reflective ways show better physical and 
psychological health” (Fivush et al., 2010, p. 46). 
Other findings also reveal that choice of narrative 
is important to our well-being, showing that “How 
we remember the stressful events of our lives 
has an impact on our ability to cope” (Fivush & 
McDermott-Sales, 2006, p. 125; McDermott Sales 
et al., 2005). Coping is not here to be understood 
as merely a backward looking matter of dealing 
with a past event – it is also a forward-looking 
matter dealing better with other, similar stressful 
future happenings.
On the face of it, it appears that as long as 
the goal and methods of scientific work are un-
derstood in appropriately modest ways, there is 
no reason why NT could not benefit from direct 
empirical assessment. Of course, any investiga-
tions would need to be conducted in ways that are 
sensitive to the nature of NT. This seems entirely 
possible (cf. Murdoch 2009, p. 509).
Indeed, taking care to identify appropriate mea-
sures and assessments, Vromans and Schweitzer 
(2011) recently conducted the first rigorous em-
pirical investigation of NT. Their findings report 
effective improvement in depressive symptoms 
and interpersonal relations after eight sessions 
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of manualized NT with 47 adults with major 
depressive disorder. Benchmarking and clinical 
significance analyses used to evaluate outcomes 
showed NT gains to be on a par with other widely 
used forms of therapy, such as Cognitive Behav-
ioral Therapy and Psychodynamic Interpersonal, 
Prolonged Exposure Therapy. However, at a three-
month follow-up, it was found that only depres-
sive symptoms and not interpersonal relatedness 
improvements were maintained.4
Clearly NT proponents need to separate sci-
entific wheat from scientistic chaff. There are 
surely ways of elucidating and understanding the 
scientific enterprise without construing it under 
the guise of grand narrative scientism. 
Folk psychology as narrative practice
The worry that NT is, at root, culturally biased 
is motivated by NT’s commitment to understand-
ing narrative practices through the lens of a West-
ern “theory of mind” (hereafter ToM). On the face 
of it, it seems hard to avoid this charge. Michael 
White, for example, more than flirts with the idea 
that NT is based on FP as a kind of culturally 
inherited ToM. He confirms the standard story 
that we need ToM “to comprehend the selves of 
others” (White, 2004, p. 38). He also speaks of 
FP, not as a practice, but as if it were something to 
be “employed”, “put into service” – as something 
that “equips us with a range of notions about what 
makes people tick” (2004, p. 19).
To think of FP in this ToMish way encourages 
a standard vision of how narrative practices relate 
to and play a part in its development. It typically 
promotes a ToM-first vision according to which 
local narrative practices put the icing on a univer-
sally sourced ToM cake. Those who subscribe to 
this view regard ToM as a universal theory about 
how mental states enable personal agency in our 
species. ToM is part of the basic equipment of all 
normally developing individuals, whereas “narra-
tives enable individuals to interface their theories 
of mind in symbolic and literal action” (Russell et 
al., 2004, p. 214, emphasis added). Accordingly 
storytelling is a given culture’s normative strategy 
through which a universal ToM is “conveyed, 
developed and practiced” (Russell et al., 2004, 
p. 214). Defending this view would be defending 
the view that seemingly Western notions of “per-
sonal agency” and “intentional states” are in fact 
truly the universal core of all human FP practice. 
There is another, better way for NT to un-
derstand the relation between FP and narrative 
practices – one that allows it to be more appro-
priately sensitive to differences in those practices 
across cultures. The alternative way to think about 
FP gives pride of place to narrative practices in a 
way that better suits NT, and which better fits the 
known facts about FP practice and development. 
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) rejects 
the idea that FP entails the existence of ToMs. It 
understands FP as a competence fostered by en-
gaging in socially supported storytelling activities 
(Hutto, 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2009, Gallagher & 
Hutto, 2008). 
The NPH holds that “storytelling practices 
scaffold folk psychological reasoning, or reasoning 
about one’s own and others’ reasons for acting” 
(Herman, 2013, p. 94). Yet this does not imply that 
engaging in narrative practices builds up a ToM 
that was already present in weaker form. Accord-
ing to the NPH, engaging with narrative practices 
does not put the icing on a pre-existing, universal 
ToM cake. Instead it is through participating in 
narrative practices that such a culturally local FP 
cake is baked. Thus “it is FP that is facilitated by 
narrative rather than vice versa” (Cobley, 2014, 
p. 227; see also Herman, 2013, pp. 296–298). 
FP is not monomorphic – one should expect the 
forms and norms of our FP explanations to vary 
systematically in line with local narrative practices 
(see Hutto & Kirchhoff, forthcoming).
Of course, going this way only exacerbates 
the worry that NT’s commitment to FP makes it 
shallow and unscientific. How best to respond? 
Undeniably, an uncritical commitment to FP can 
promote oversimplified ideas and misleading pic-
tures about how minds really work. Many are at-
tracted to the idea that intentional attitudes – such 
as beliefs, desires and emotions – are neatly and 
discretely defined, causally efficacious, content-
bearing inner states that figure in nicely staged 
and sequenced linear processes and operations. 
However, it seems the mind is messier than that.
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Putting emotion in the spotlight, Baumeister 
et al. (2007) make this point vividly. They trade 
the simplistic and intuitively appealing idea that 
mental states directly cause behavior for a vision 
of mental processing that understands cognitive 
influence in more complex, dynamical and holistic 
terms. 
People will explain someone’s behavior in terms 
of “because she was mad” or “because he was 
afraid”, as opposed to saying “anger directed her 
cognitive processing to focus disproportionately 
on certain possible outcomes, whereupon her 
behavioral decision process failed to take certain 
potential risks into account” or “fear temporar-
ily reordered his goal priorities, causing him to 
abandon one goal in favor of the seemingly urgent 
albeit irrational goal of escaping the situation 
(Baumeister et al., 2007, p. 168).
Let us assume the second analysis is closer to 
the truth. Even if it is, FP’s lack of transparency 
about the underlying dynamics of mind is only a 
problem for FP if it is assumed that FP is in the 
business of trying to give causal explanations of 
this sort in the first place. FP’s explanation will 
only be deemed shallow if it is assumed that FP 
and cognitive science are competing on this score. 
If that is the case then one can motivate eliminativ-
ism about FP on the grounds that its explanations 
are inferior to those of the cognitive sciences. 
Once we construe FP as a narrative practice 
that is not interested in offering causal explana-
tions that compete with those of the cognitive sci-
ences it becomes possible to view the relationship 
between FP and cognitive science as cooperative, 
not competing (see Hutto, 2011 for a detailed 
argument). This fits with Kirmayer’s assessment 
that we are “on the threshold of a renaissance, 
in which complex-systems thinking will allow us 
to integrate neuroscience, psychology, and the 
social sciences” (Kirmayer, 2015, p. 1169). View-
ing FP as a narrative practice – one that provides 
normalizing explanations that are personal and 
particular as opposed to causal explanations of a 
general, mechanical sort – allows us to see how 
our narratives can reveal new opportunities for 
action, just as NT assumes. Embodied, enactive 
and ecological approaches to mind are perfectly 
poised to explicate the basis of “skills that are 
evident in our ways of living, in our acts of life” 
(White, 2004, p. 39). New thinking about how 
we come to respond to affordances in embodied, 
enactive ways holds out the promise of deeper il-
lumination into how NT works, which may lead 
to potential improvements. 
One goal of cognitive science could be to to 
investigate just how narrative activity manages to 
affect changes in our skill set, without assuming 
that FP explanations will form part of the best 
mature explanation of this process. Adherents 
of FP can agree, just as eliminativists claim, that 
propositional attitudes directly causing actions is 
unlikely to figure in our best developed scientific 
accounts of the basic nature of minds and how 
they operate (cf. Churchland, 2007). Hence, to 
contend that FP doesn’t tell us much if anything 
about the underlying dynamics of the mind is no 
reason at all to dismiss person-focused therapeutic 
approaches that make use of FP practices. 
Selves as patterns
Are there ways for NT to get beyond its at-
tachment to post-structuralist conceptions of 
the decentered self? To embrace the concept of a 
postmodern self, after all, is self-defeating for NT. 
Rather than seeing the subject as a locus of control 
over its individual life, the post-structuralist view 
understands the subject to be the subjected – the 
product of larger forces of language and power 
(e.g., Foucault, 1988). But that means that any 
post-structuralist bid for emancipation or self-
management appealing to narrative as a means 
for self-formation would be seen as an illusion; 
since language is not something under individual 
control every individual is shaped by social forces. 
In contrast, a pattern theory of self better suits 
NT in suggesting that things are more complicated 
than either the Cartesian extreme of total self-
governance or the post-structuralist extreme of 
a completely emaciated self (Gallagher, 2013). It 
begins by acknowledging that there are determin-
ing forces of biology and sociality over which we 
do not exercise control. The facticity of human 
embodiment and the fact that we are necessarily 
intersubjective beings place real (material) limits 
on the type of identities that we can take on. At 
the same time, however, these factors are enabling 
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conditions that allow us to engage in actions and 
joint endeavors that permit some degree of tran-
scendence and freedom.  
Narrative is double-barrelled in the same way. 
Just as language places limitations on how we can 
make ourselves understood, at the same time al-
lowing for an infinite number of ways to express 
ourselves, narrative practices likewise can be 
conservative and reproductive, and yet offer the 
resources for criticism and transformation. How is 
this possible? In this regard, there are two impor-
tant things to consider: (1) the nature of narrative 
itself, specifically the concept of narrative distance, 
and (2) the fact that we are not merely narrative 
selves – narrators or narrated subjects. 
First, narrative has a certain internal structure 
described in the concept of narrative distance. 
Narrative distance is a concept that goes back to 
Aristotle’s Poetics. It indicates how far removed 
the narrator is from the narrated events (Andringa, 
1996; Lothe, 2000). For example, there is less 
distance between the narrator and the narrated 
events if the narration is done in the first person 
versus third person (this is perspectival distance); 
the amount of time between the narration and the 
narrated events characterizes a temporal distance; 
and the extent and the valence of the narrator’s 
evaluation of the events (evaluative distance) can 
also be a measure of narrative distance. Finally, 
various interpretive aspects of narration intro-
duce limitations and biases into the recounting of 
events. All narrative recounting is an interpreta-
tion due to factors such as the narrator’s interest 
or purpose, the audience and its expectations, etc. 
(Bedwell et al., 2011; Gadamer, 1989; Ricoeur, 
1981).
The same concept applies to autobiographical 
(or self-) narrative. Specifically, there is always 
some distance between the self who narrates and 
the self who is narrated. When the narrator says, 
for example, “I had a great journey,” the ‘I’ points 
in two directions: to the narrator, signifying that 
the narrator means to say something about herself; 
and to the person or character whom the narrator 
was, at some point in the past, during the journey. 
The narrator implies an identity between herself 
and the person she is talking about, but there 
is necessarily some degree of difference or non-
identity involved. Narrative distance allows for 
some critical space to open up, and this itself can 
introduce some degree of control and transforma-
tion in terms of how I want to understand myself. 
This kind of critical narrative distance is essential 
for self-management.
Second, this is not the whole story because we 
are not just narrative selves. The capacity we have 
for narrative is only one factor in a pattern of exis-
tence that includes biological and experiential fac-
tors, social and psychological factors, emotional 
and situational factors. Narrative practices, and 
the critical distance they can open up, can give us 
some leverage for self-management and transfor-
mation; but they could provide no such leverage 
unless we were also embodied beings able to act 
and to have a sense of agency for such action. And 
such action would be entirely unmotivated unless 
we were already in the world and with others, en-
gaged in joint actions or in oppositional reactions, 
or retreating from such engagements because we 
are depressed, or broken-hearted, or alienated or 
traumatized. 
A pattern theory of self emphasizes this multidi-
mensional existence where possibilities outlined by 
narrative are possibilities only because we are em-
bodied actors situated in pragmatic contexts with 
others. Therapy, or, importantly, self-management 
can target any of these factors in order to target 
them all. A change in narrative self-understanding 
can modulate our intersubjective behaviors; a 
change in bodily practices can transform our 
narrative self-understanding; a change in worldly 
circumstances, or mood, or instituted practice can 
equally affect all the other factors that make us 
who we are. 
Conclusion
NT is aptly placed to inform approaches to the 
self-management of mental health. Insofar as NT is 
based on changing and developing self-narratives, 
it supports those who abandon the idea that the 
job of therapy is the expert treatment of afflicting 
mental disorders and instead see it as working to 
make individuals more adept and expert in cop-
ing with life challenges. NT strategies provide the 
means for individuals to be actively and centrally 
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engaged in the enhancement and maintenance of 
their own well-being.
Unfortunately there has been ‘little focus on 
what aspects of narrative representation may be 
most fruitful to target for change or repair’ (Rus-
sell et al., 2004, p. 215). Apart from a philosophi-
cally informed re-authoring of NT’s official story, 
another major agenda item is to determine which 
kinds of narrative (identifying their special proper-
ties) and which practices (the way such narratives 
are used) best aid promotion of psychosocial 
well-being. Mental health policymakers should 
be made aware of the promise of NT and take 
it into account when recommending appropriate 
courses of self-managed treatment and customized 
assistance. 
Notes
1. Vromans and Schweitzer report: “Currently, no 
rigorous empirical support exists for narrative therapy. 
The omission likely arises from fundamental differences 
in theories of knowledge distinguishing postmodernist 
from modernist thought” (Vromans & Schweitzer, 
2011, p. 4). 
2. This raises wider questions about other, epistemic 
differences in the narrative practices of various cultures 
about whether and how any given narratives “fit with 
templates . . . exemplars of ‘good explanations’ . . . 
external, cultural forms” (Kirmayer, 2003, p. 172).
3. The need for re-authoring is something leading 
NT proponents accept. Epston raises the worry that 
NT may be “becoming theoretically passé” (Epston, 
2011, p. xxxvi).
4. Vromans and Schweitzer (2011) note that their 
research “was limited by its small sample” and lacked 
“generalizability” (Vromans & Schweitzer, 2011, p. 13). 
This highlights the need for further comparative and 
more in-depth research designed with larger samples 
targeting a wider variety of populations and complaints.
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